MANTRAYA SPECIAL REPORT#24: 10 NOVEMBER 2025
ADARSH VIJAY & SHANTHIE MARIET D’SOUZA
Abstract
Afghanistan was the world’s opium capital until 2023. Driven by political and economic instability, Afghanistan’s illicit drug economy is deeply socially rooted. This article seeks to understand the factors and dynamics impacting the current state of illicit drug trafficking in Afghanistan. It probes into the workings of the narcotic ban imposed by the Taliban in 2022 and its implications for Afghanistan and regional countries – Iran and Pakistan. The article examines the current illicit drug production and trafficking patterns in relation to the pre-ban scenario, employing a comparative and mixed-methods approach. It also analyses the impact of continuing “Badakhshan anomaly” as a force multiplier in the Afghan narco-economy. Finally, it prognosticates the trajectory of the Taliban’s anti-illicit drug policy and its implications for Afghanistan and the region.
Afghanistan: Breaking the ‘Nexus’
Historically, Afghanistan has been the world’s largest illicit opium poppy (Papaver somniferum L.) producer. Opium, the dried latex obtained from the seed pods of the opium poppy, is a non-synthetic narcotic. The Afghan heroin, a semisynthetic opioid produced by the acetylation of morphine,[1] an opiate alkaloid precursor naturally found in opium, reaches markets in Asia, Europe, and West Asia through Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia.[2] In 2022, 80 per cent of the world’s opiate supply was from Afghanistan.[3] The total opium output in 2022 stood at 6,200 tons, which offered 250-580 tons of export quality (50-70 per cent purity) heroin.[4] This narcotics industry, centred around the Taliban’s heartland in the country’s southwestern provinces, particularly Helmand, was sustained by a symbiotic nexus between the farmers, the traffickers and the insurgents. The narco-traffickers were invariably a source of revenue and arms for the insurgents, whereas the latter protected the opium growers and traffickers against the erstwhile civilian government.[5] The Taliban and its various factions were involved in the illicit drug trade between 1994 and 2022, a position that changed following their capture of power.[6]
The Ban: Rationale & Implications
The Taliban-run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan imposed a ban on opium and all narcotics on 3 April 2022. The Decree on the “Prohibition of Poppy Cultivation and All Types of Narcotics,” issued by Hibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of the new regime, banned not only the cultivation but the “usage, transportation, manufacture, trade, export, and import of all types of narcotics.”[7] The Taliban gave an informal 10-month reprieve for the opium smugglers to sell their stockpile before the crackdown.[8] The resultant surplus availability vis-à-vis unchanged demand led to a drastic fall in opium production. The area under poppy cultivation declined from 232,000 hectares (ha)[9] in 2022 to 10,800 ha in 2023.[10]
The trend, however, might be undergoing some reversal. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the national opium production increased by 30 per cent in 2024 over the previous year.[11] The UNODC also observes that the “Opiate stocks in Afghanistan at the end of 2022 are estimated to have totalled 13,200 tons, which could be sufficient to meet the demand for Afghan opiates until 2027.”[12] The Taliban followed up with another ban on precursor chemicals in January 2023 and cannabis on 8 March 2023.[13]
The Post-Ban Drug Trade: From Opiates to Synthetic Drugs
The Taliban’s ban on cultivation, trade, and use of all narcotics has had a profound and complex impact. The impact and nature of enforcement have varied by region. The immediate phase, since the ban in 2022, involved a heavy-handed approach against both opiates and synthetic drug manufacturing. Reports indicate that the Taliban’s war on drugs began immediately with the synthetic methamphetamines (Meth, hereafter) before targeting the opium trade only by late 2023.[14] The highland-based Ephedra crop and pan-national ephedrine (a precursor used in the synthesis of Meth) labs, which are instrumental in the making of Meth, were among the first targets of the drug ban. The Southwestern province of Farah’s Abdul Wadood Bazaar, potentially touted as the world’s largest illicit drug market, witnessed unprecedented restrictions, such as its entire shutdown and action against the ephedrine labs.[15]
Satellite imagery has been the dominant source of data on the extent of opium cultivation in post-drug ban Afghanistan. The projected 433 tons of opium produced in 2024 is potentially convertible into 32-50 tons of heroin, thus marking a 93 per cent fall from the pre-ban levels.[16] The post-ban phase, however, is characterised by new land use patterns. The spread of opium cultivation fields accounts for 12,800 ha in 2024,[17] which is 19 per cent more than in 2023. By 2024, the traditional dominance of Southwestern provinces in the opium harvest had disappeared, with the Northeastern provinces accounting for 59 per cent of opium production.[18] Data point, particularly in the Badakhshan province, which has emerged as the largest opium growing province. The total opium trade value in 2024 was estimated to be $260 million, and the farmers’ revenue indicated a 130 per cent increase compared to 2023.[19] This trend was due to a slight increase in the opium yield, coupled with the tenfold rise in its global price. A kilogram of opium was worth $750 in 2024, which amounted to US$75 in 2022.[20]
However, while the opiates suffered the maximum, Meth, which has a strong demand in the illicit markets of Europe and Oceania,[21] found better adaptability. While drug labs, in general, were reportedly burned down by the Taliban forces,[22] the gain was offset by the setup of new labs and the relocation of the dealer base to remote areas.[23] Meth in particular and synthetic drugs in general have an advantage over the plant-based drugs, such as opium or marijuana/cannabis. Manufacturing of synthetic drugs is easily relocatable and concealable, and doesn’t require land or extensive labour.[24] Curiously, therefore, the eradication and the curtailed cultivation of opium enhanced the manufacture and export of synthetic drugs, leading to the synthetic drugs becoming the mainstay of the Afghan narco-economy.[25]
The International Narcotics Control Bureau (INCB)’s 2024 report validates this and lists occurrences of Meth seizures across the neighbouring states in Central Asia, South-West Asia and Türkiye.[26] This is attributed to the continuing availability of ephedra. The narco-trafficking through the northern drug trade route from Afghanistan leading to Russia continues to thrive due to the vulnerability of the bordering Central Asian States, marked by harsh terrain and a critical deficit in training/technical means in the detection of drug trafficking channels and equipment.[27]
The Iran Factor
Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has not been a major drug-producing country.[28] However, with porous borders, it remains a pivotal node in the Balkan transit route for drug trafficking from Afghanistan to the markets in Africa, Asia, and the West, including Central Europe.[29] Despite the UN’s claim that Afghan poppy production fell in 2023, in November that year, Amir Abbas Lotfi, Director General of the International Relations Office of the Drug Control Headquarters in Iran, said that the quantum of production of psychotropic substances increased.[30] He also confirmed that there are occurrences of Afghanistan’s narcotics being trafficked to Iran even after the ban.[31] This is corroborated by the UNODC’s Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023, which finds that Iran constitutes the largest share of opium seizures since mid-2021.[32] However, another study claimed that by 2023, due to the Afghan drug ban, the opium supply as well as seizures had dropped in Iran, leading to a higher opium price.[33]
In addition, Iran is also emerging as a production base for Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS).[34] Iranian illicit drug producers are predominantly involved in the final-stage processing of Meth for external markets.[35] In mushrooming labs, Iranian “cooks” process not only liquid Meth into crystalline form, but also Ephedrine, possibly synthesised from ephedra of Afghan origin.[36]
Information on the Iranian actors involved in the drug trade, however, is sketchy. State agencies such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij and the Quds Force have been accused of involvement in narco-trafficking for a long time. Back in 2007, the former head of the Quds Force based in Zahedan (capital of Sistan and Baluchestan), Gholamreza Baghbani, was designated a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker by the United States (US) Department of Treasury as he “allowed Afghan narcotics traffickers to smuggle opiates through Iran in return for assistance.”[37] The Treasury also noted that the “Afghan narcotics traffickers moved weapons to the Taliban on behalf of Baghbani. In return, General Baghbani has helped facilitate the smuggling of heroin precursor chemicals through the Iranian border. He also helped facilitate shipments of opium into Iran.”[38]
There have also been past claims that the IRGC, operating through “invisible” jetties and exports,[39] facilitates the drug trade to Iraq and Türkiye.[40] Although there is no concrete evidence, the IRGC has been accused of generating revenue through illicit drug supply chains. Many of these accusations came from Iran’s neighbour, Azerbaijan.[41]
In 2023, Tehran rejected the UNODC’s report, which claimed that the opium production in Afghanistan was in decline.[42] Nevertheless, lesser opium availability through seizures, owing to the ban, posed a challenge to Iran’s health sector. The Iranian Food and Drug Administration’s domestic production of opioid-based medications, including analgesics, antitussives, anaesthetics, and opium tincture, remains dependent on supplies derived from the seized opium.[43] Post-Afghan drug ban, an increase in poppy cultivation was also reported in the Iranian provinces of Fars, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh, Sistan, and Baluchestan, and Yazd.[44]
In August 2024, Tehran and Kabul had agreed on collaborative efforts against narcotics and drug trafficking through information sharing, exchanging experiences, providing educational resources for drug prevention and the establishment of joint committees.[45] In March 2025, Iran’s Deputy Interior Minister Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian reemphasised the need for cooperation in combating drug trafficking in a meeting with Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics, Lieutenant General Mullah Abdul Haq Akhund Hammar, in Tehran.[46]
The Pakistan Connect: Balochistan as the New ‘Hot Spot’
Pakistan’s connection with Afghanistan’s opium boom dates back to its support for the Mujahideen in sustaining the smuggling pipeline during the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the Pakistani establishment aided the Mujahideen in maintaining their heroin pipeline through the Durand Line into the North-West Frontier Province.[47] With the Taliban expanding their footprint from Kandahar (where the movement’s political leadership is based) to Helmand (the major poppy-growing region at that time) in late 1994 and early 1995, they imposed a ban on the drug trade.[48] However, the prohibition was short-lived. Later, the Taliban’s laissez-faire approach to drug cultivation in terms of taxing the farmers and traffickers and the provision of security for the latter became a source of revenue.[49] This resulted in a new drug pipeline in the region, which also survived the Taliban’s July 2000 drug ban.
In the past, there have been allegations about Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)’s role in “rogue” drug operations with Afghans.[50] In 1994, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that the then Army Chief General Aslam Beg and the head of ISI, General Asad Durrani, had presented a blueprint to him to raise money through large-scale drug deals to fund the country’s covert military operations in early 1991.[51]
In 2022, the complicity of ISI and the Pakistan Army in the illicit narcotics trade in the Af-Pak region was validated by NATO in its report titled “Narco-Insecurity, Inc.”[52] The report points out the support offered by ISI through covert operations with similar jihadist groups who depended on narco-trafficking to fund their activities.[53] The Haqqani network, a key ally of ISI, facilitated the consequent crime-terror nexus. Pakistan’s role was critical for the Taliban in establishing their drug dominance in Central Asia and enhancing the market reach in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Gulf and South Asia. This also coincided with the addition of the Balkan, northern, and southern routes to the global narco-trafficking pipeline.
Pakistan’s Balochistan has been a key provincial lever in the country’s drug trade. Out of Pakistan’s approximate 2640-kilometre disputed boundary with Afghanistan, 1460 kilometres runs across Balochistan. The province also has a 960-kilometre border with Iran. The heroin processing laboratories in Balochistan’s Chagai, along with Afghanistan’s Nimroz province and Iran’s Zahedan, are the pillars of the Golden Crescent region. Despite limited evidence, cross-border separatism and violence against the backdrop of the Baloch insurgency are often cited as a factor in sustaining the drug trade in the region.
Though there are no clear estimates available about the number of processing labs, Balochistan continues to be a hotspot of narcotics both in terms of source and transit.[54] After the Taliban’s drug ban, many poppy farmers in Afghanistan have reportedly relocated to this province.[55] It was a repeat phenomenon of the 2000 drug ban by the Taliban,[56] which led to an increase in poppy cultivation in Pakistan, and Balochistan saw poppy cultivation for the first time. Thus, Balochistan was no longer just a transit route but a producer of illicit poppy. The farmer migration after the 2022 ban, primarily from Afghanistan’s southern provinces, contributes to the cross-border poppy cultivation patterns in Balochistan. Satellite imagery reveals that almost 70 per cent of Baluchistan’s agricultural land was devoted to poppy cultivation in 2025.[57] As a result, the total area of poppy cultivation in Pakistan greater than that in Afghanistan at present.[58] The poppy crops are grown in the districts such as Killa Abdullah, Pishin, Chaman, and Zhob.[59] An increase in illegal poppy cultivation is also reported in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[60]
The potential revenue from this narcotics economy is also a serious challenge to the Pakistani establishment. A simultaneous higher visibility of armed groups, ranging from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) to the People’s Resistance Movement of Iran in Pakistan and their reliance on illicit drug value chains have also been acknowledged.[61]
The illicit poppy cultivation in Balochistan has contributed towards a rise in drug addiction in the province, particularly in Quetta.[62] The fishing community in Balochistan’s Gwadar is also turning to narcotrafficking as the local fisheries are being depleted due to Chinese fishing operations and non-Gwadaris having the upper hand in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)-led employment opportunities.[63] The Balochistan government, in response to increasing heroin and opium seizures in North Pakistan and the border regions of Pakistan and Iran,[64] has also adopted a stringent crackdown against the cultivation and smuggling of drugs.[65] These impacts of the Afghan drug ban on Pakistan reflect the adaptability of narco-traffickers against anti-narcotic policies. It also makes it clear that the epicentre of South Asia’s illicit drug is the Af-Pak region.
Badakhshan: An Outlier
Badakhshan province, where the majority population are Tajik and Uzbek, shares international borders with China, Pakistan and Tajikistan. In Badakhshan, opium is a staple narcotic crop. It has been traditionally known to be used for self-consumption in the province.[66] Historical anecdotes prove that opium found its way to the province from China and Bukhara through the Silk Road.[67] Though Badakhshan’s association with opium for self-consumption is as old as the 18th century, its profile as an opium grower is a 20th-century development.[68] The then Prime Minister Daud Khan imposed an opium ban in the province in 1958. Thanks to the catastrophic effect on food security (with opium being the most critical cash crop), the cultivation rebounded in 1959 itself.[69] Eventually, the Afghan Civil Wars (1989-1992 and 1992-1996) and the state’s collapse further reignited the illicit narcotic harvest in Badakhshan. The province also withstood the opium ban by the first Taliban regime since it emerged as one of the two provincial bastions of anti-Taliban resistance along with Panjshir. The province has invariably been under an ethnic-driven conflict fog since the Pashtun-dominated Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.
Opiate rise in Badakhshan coexists with the decline of opium production in the Taliban’s stronghold provinces, including Helmand, the country’s hitherto largest opium producer. As per the UNODC report, Afghanistan’s southern provinces have become poppy-free in terms of cultivation since 2023.[70] This development is partly due to the traditional allegiance and respect of the farmers in the Southern provinces for the De facto Authorities (DfA).[71] However, according to UNODC data, in Badakhshan, opium cultivation in terms of land usage has grown from 3,561 ha in 2021 to 7,408 ha in 2024,[72] representing a 371 per cent change in land usage from 2023 to 2024.[73]
In other words, the higher production of opium in Badakhshan, a mountainous province with its difficult terrains and social volatilities, is indirectly proportional to the Taliban’s territorial outreach and surveillance efforts. Following the pattern in 2000, many poppy farmers have reportedly migrated to Badakhshan after the present drug ban.[74] Unlike in the other provinces, the Taliban could not build a support network for the drug ban in Badakhshan.[75] Though the Taliban claim to have Badakhshan under full control, local unrest and protests against the regime are frequent in the region. Reportedly, many local Taliban commanders were also reluctant to enforce the ban in Badakhshan.[76] Pashtun drug traffickers from the Southern provinces are also relying on these farmers for processing their opium into heroin for international markets.[77]
The economy, reeling under the Western sanctions, asset freezes, banking restrictions and aid cuts, lost a major source of income in the aftermath of the ban on drugs. The Taliban takeover resulted in a 26 per cent drop in their national economic output.[78] The World Drug Report 2025 states that “In 2021, the latest year for which data were available for Afghanistan, the value of potential opiate exports was between roughly $1.7 billion and $2.6 billion, or 9–13 per cent of the country’s GDP.”[79] The illicit industries, including the drug sector, were estimated to be equivalent to or larger than the country’s licit economy.[80] The drug ban impacted around 6.9 million Afghans,[81] resulting in social costs like the increase in school dropout rates and early marriage for girls. Since opium is a labour-intensive crop and its cultivation is the primary employment for both men and women in a third of Afghan villages, the ban impacted the labourers, particularly women. The ban affected the big and the small farmers differently. The grace period offered by the Taliban allowed the wealthy farmers to mass-produce and make profits by selling opium at inflated prices.[82] Not surprisingly, therefore, most big landowners and traffickers have even supported the drug ban, as it enabled them to sell their existing stockpiles of dried opium at higher prices.[83] Small-scale farmers could hardly afford this luxury.
The Northeastern provinces, including Badakhshan, were somewhat uniquely positioned to defy the ban, given the gender and other dynamics of opium cultivation. Unlike in the ultra-orthodox Southeastern provinces, where women have been known for a supportive role, such as preparing food for opium labourers, women in the Northeastern regions are known for direct engagement in the poppy cultivation.[84] Further, in Badakhshan, small-scale farmers dominate the opium sector with an ownership of only a quarter to a half a hectare on average.[85] With small landholdings and predominantly a single cropping season (typically involving opium poppy sown in autumn and harvested in June and July),[86] the farmers in Badakshan have no scope to grow sufficient food.[87] Even for those who have rain-fed land, the alternative crops are no match for the income that opium promises.[88] Therefore, their need for livelihood security rendered the threat of crop eradication by the Taliban authorities insignificant.
In consequence, the poppy growers in Badakhshan have resorted to “secretive” poppy cultivation, often hidden among orchards, behind high walls, or in secluded valleys.”[89] The reputation of Badakhshan opium, particularly the small amount of poppies organically grown on the higher altitude rainfed land (usually sown in early spring), also helped fetch a higher price compared to those in lower-altitude regions.[90] And then, there were systemic factors such as the increasing price of opium and the lack of capacity among the Taliban to enforce the ban. Very few had trust in the Taliban’s promise of aid as a reward for curbing poppy cultivation. Moreover, the lack of alternative crops continued to sustain Badakhshan’s opium economy and can even contribute to its growth, especially the high-altitude variety.
Badakhshan’s sudden ascent in opium metrics may also have ethnoreligious dimensions. On the one hand, the unwillingness of local people, who are largely Tajiks and Uzbeks, can be attributed to their resistance to a diktat by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Opium production could be a Salafi and Ismaili sects’ reaction to a narcotic ban by a Deobandi Taliban in its DfA capacity.
Badakhshan also witnessed multiple protests in May 2024 against the poppy eradication campaigns across the Darayim and Argo districts.[91] The Taliban used force as well as concessions to win the farmers over, albeit unsuccessfully. Use of force by the Taliban led to the death of several protestors.[92] A Taliban counternarcotic operation in the Khash district in July 2025 resulted in 15 civilian deaths, including one woman.[93] A United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report claimed that violence had broken out in Khash district in May 2024 as well.[94] Three Taliban security personnel associated with the poppy eradication operations were killed in a bomb blast at Faizabad, the provincial capital, in the same month,[95] for which the ISKP had claimed responsibility.[96]
The UNAMA report also states that there were four incidents of protests in May and June 2025 in the Argo, Khash, and Jurm districts.[97] Taliban resorted to firing, beating and arbitrary detention of the protestors. These incidents resulted in the death of ten people.[98] The busting of a drug processing lab in Badakhshan in September 2025 also reveals a new trend: the production of synthetic drugs in the province despite the narcotic ban.[99] Climate change-led weather challenges, including rainfall anomalies leading to droughts and catastrophic floods, are also redefining the Afghan opiate trajectories.
The local Taliban forces in the province are against the poppy and marijuana eradication efforts.[100] Guided by the apprehensions of growing anti-regime sentiments, the Taliban have also lowered their position to a “relative tolerance” in the province with respect to the narcotic crop farming and harvest.[101] This leniency, a tactic to gain legitimacy, may result in the replication of the Badakhshan model in other poppy-growing provinces. Poppy growers in other provinces may also perceive the narcotic ban as negotiable and subject to local interpretation. Moreover, this also suggests that local economic and social realities can supersede Taliban edicts as the approach in Badakhshan weakens the DfA’s image of a unified entity. In some areas, the Taliban has been observed to facilitate and profit from the trade rather than curb it. This includes levying fines and taxes on the transport of ephedra, which ultimately boosts the producers’ profits and increases revenue for the Taliban.
In the absence of alternative livelihoods and economic opportunities, Provinces in the South West, e.g. Gereshk district of Helmand, are growing behind walled compounds, fenced plots, mixed cropping and share cropping patterns. Milder eradication efforts could have led to an increase in opium cultivation in Ghor province, on the border with northern Helmand, in the areas of Talmastan, Rauf, Dahan Rauf, Pitab and Dara Korkchak, which are Hazara-majority areas, about 90 per cent of the land had been leased to opium traders from Baghran and Musa Qala of Helmand province and used to grow poppies.
Prognosis
The two-year drop in opium harvest can be attributed to the farmers’ adherence to the ban. At the same time, according to UNODC, market dynamics and farmer distress contributed towards the resurgence in opium production in 2024.[102] Lack of sustainable economic alternatives and financial weakness induce them back into poppy cultivation. Moreover, the continuing ban on narcotics is expected to result in a further increase in their demand and price globally.[103]
Some of the challenges the DfA has encountered vis-à-vis the drug ban include a lack of economic alternatives for farmers, corruption and weak enforcement. While the current drug ban has been effective, given the unprecedented drop in opium production, poppy cultivation returning to its heyday in Afghanistan seems unlikely. In the last three years, the Taliban’s reliance on revenue from opium may have decreased but not completely stopped, particularly at the mid and lower levels. Although the immediate but insignificant rise of Badakhshan as a poppy-growing region can hardly make up for the decline in the national production, it has aided drug smugglers from Kandahar and Helmand. Moreover, it could be a force multiplier for other provinces in the South and West to emulate.
While a fear-based elimination of opium is possible, it ultimately leads to a state collapse, as poppy is at the heart of the political economy of the country.[104] However, the Taliban appears to be at work, mollifying the farmers as well as its local commanders and enforcement personnel who are sympathetic to the farmers due to the absence of alternatives for the latter. The Taliban are seemingly working on expensive varieties of cash crops, such as hing (a spice), saffron or garlic that could replace poppy.[105] Even with the reality of the dire condition of erstwhile poppy-growing farmers, the poppy cultivation would sustain only in a secretive (in gardens and private/house yards) and in limited ways. However, synthetic drug production poses a different challenge, over which the Taliban may not have much control. Afghanistan, with rising internet usage and connectivity, could be shifting toward digital markets.
The Afghan drug trade isn’t much of a domestic issue. Drying up of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan benefits the entire world, especially the European countries, which are its primary destination. Therefore, the international community does have a responsibility to dismantle the Afghan drug economy by aiding Afghanistan in developing an effective counternarcotics strategy that addresses the demand and supply side of the equation and at the same time. There is a need for a comprehensive strategy that hinges on alternate livelihood, Community-led initiatives, capacity building, monitoring and technical assistance, regional counter-narcotic framework and greater International assistance to help Afghanistan deal with the illicit drug trade and prevent a regional and global spill over.
END NOTES
[1] European Union Drugs Agency. “Heroin Drug Profile.” European Union. https://www.euda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/heroin_en
[2] Office of National Drug Control Policy. “The International Heroin Market.” The White House, United States. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/global-heroin-market
[3] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan: Latest Findings and Emerging Threats.” November 2022. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Opium_cultivation_Afghanistan_2022.pdf
[4] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 2: 2024 Opium Production and Rural Development.” November 2024. https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/42343/2/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V2.pdf
[5] Office of National Drug Control Policy. “The International Heroin Market.”
[6] Hekmatullah Azizi. “The Nature and Extent of the Taliban’s Involvement in the Drug Trade before and after the Regime Change (1994–2022): Insights from Experts.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 35, no. 8 (2024): 1417–1445. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2024.2381847
[7] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 1: Opium Poppy Cultivation 2024.” November 2024. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V1.pdf
[8] International Crisis Group. “Trouble In Afghanistan’s Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs.” Asia Report N°340, 12 September 2024. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/340-afghanistan-opium-fields.pdf
[9] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 2: 2024 Opium Production and Rural Development.”
[10] Ibid.
[11] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 2: 2024 Opium Production and Rural Development.”
[12] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights Volume 4: Drug Trafficking and Opiate Stocks.” January 2025. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V4.pdf
[13] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023: Cultivation and Production after the Ban – Effects and Implications.” November 2023. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2023.pdf
[14] International Crisis Group. “Trouble In Afghanistan’s Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs.”
[15] David Mansfield. “Taliban Drugs Ban: Truly Unprecedented.” ALCIS, 7 June 2023. https://www.alcis.org/post/taliban-drugs-ban
[16] United Nations Information Service. “Afghanistan: Opium production remains 93 per cent below pre-drug ban levels, says UNODC.” UNIS/NAR/1492, 27 November 2024. https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2024/unisnar1492.html
[17] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 2: 2024 Opium Production and Rural Development.”
[18] Jelena Bjelica and Fabrizio Foschini. “Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan: The New National Leader, According to UNODC.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 13 November 2024. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/opium-cultivation-in-badakhshan-the-new-national-leader-according-to-undoc/
[19] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 2: 2024 Opium Production and Rural Development.”
[20] Man Aman Singh Chhina. “Opium prices in Afghanistan near historic peaks due to shortage: UNODC report.” The Indian Express, 13 March 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/opium-prices-in-afghanistan-near-historic-peaks-due-to-shortage-unodc-report-9884607/
[21] United Nations International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). “Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2023: Asia.” Vienna: United Nations, 2024. https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2023/Annual_Report_Chapters/064_Asia.pdf
[22] International Crisis Group. “Trouble In Afghanistan’s Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs.”
[23] Ibid.
[24] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime . “Understanding Illegal Methamphetamine Manufacture in Afghanistan.” August 2023. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/briefs/Methamphetamine_Manufacture_in_Afghanistan.pdf
[25] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Methamphetamine Trafficking in and around Afghanistan Expanding Rapidly as Heroin Trade Slows.” Kabul/Vienna, 10 September 2023. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2023/September/unodc_-methamphetamine-trafficking-in-and-around-afghanistan-expanding-rapidly-as-heroin-trade-slows.html
[26] International Narcotics Control Board. “The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2024 (E/INCB/2024/1).” United Nations, 2025. https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2024/Annual_Report/E-INCB-2024-1-ENG.pdf
[27] Ibid.
[28] U.S. Department of State. “Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” 2006 Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control. 3 October 2005. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/ci/ir/75431.htm
[29] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Opiates and Methamphetamine Trafficking on the Balkan Route: Drug Flows, Illicit Incomes and Illicit Financial Flows.” United Nations, 2025. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/IFF/2025/Balkan_Route.pdf
[30] Iran International. “Iran Rejects UN Claims That Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation in Decline.” 28 November 2023. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311284600
[31] Ibid.
[32] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023: Cultivation and Production after the Ban – Effects and Implications.”
[33] Bijan Pirnia. “Opioid Agonist Treatment in Iran after an Opium Poppy Ban in Afghanistan.” The Lancet Psychiatry 11, no. 6 (2024): 411-412.
[34] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Drug Trafficking and Border Control: Situation Analysis – Islamic Republic of Iran.” https://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/drug-trafficking-and-border-control.html
[35] European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). “Methamphetamine Developments in South Asia: Study of the Situation in Iran and the Implications for the EU and Its Neighbours”. EU4MD Special Report, 2020. https://www.euda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/13703/EU4MD_Methamphetamine-situation-in-Iran_final.pdf
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ahmad Majidyar. “Quds Force Reportedly Uses Regional Shiite Militias for Drug Smuggling into Europe.” Middle East Institute, 17 April 2017. https://www.mei.edu/publications/quds-force-reportedly-uses-regional-shiite-militias-drug-smuggling-europe
[38] Ibid.
[39] Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. “Under the Shadow: Illicit Economies in Iran.” October 2020. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Under-the-shadow-Illicit-economies-in-Iran-GITOC.pdf
[40] Ibid.
[41] Sami Kronenfeld and Yoel Guzansky. “The Revolutionary Guards and the International Drug Trade.” Military and Strategic Affairs 5, no. 2 (September 2013): 105–120. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/MASA5-2Eng6_KronenfeldGuzansky.pdf
[42] Iran International. “Iran Rejects UN Claims That Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation In Decline.” 28 November 2023. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311284600
[43] Azadeh Farhoudian and Seyed R. Radfar. “How Substance Use Treatment Services in Iran Survived Despite a Dual Catastrophic Situation.” American Journal of Public Health 112, no. S2 (April 2022): S133-S135. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2022.306794
[44] David Mansfield. “Opiate Supplies Continue Despite the Taliban Drugs Ban.” ALCIS, 17 June 2025. https://www.alcis.org/post/opiate-supplies-continue-despite-the-taliban-drugs-ban
[45] Swapna Nair. “Iran, Afghanistan Join Hands to Combat Drug Trafficking.” Sputnik News, 22 August 2024. https://sputniknews.in/20240822/iran-afghanistan-join-hands-to-combat-drug-trafficking-8045872.html
[46] Iran Daily. “Iran Calls for Afghanistan Cooperation to Combat Drug Trafficking.” 4 March 2025. https://newspaper.irandaily.ir/7785/8/14259
[47] David R Winston. “Narco-Insecurity, Inc.: The Convergence of the Narcotics Underworld and Extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Its Global Proliferation.” Edited by Victoria Jones, Marcus Andreopoulos, and Thomas Hader. NATO Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), 2022. https://deepportal.hq.nato.int/eacademy/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Narco-Insecurity-Inc.pdf
[48] Vanda Felbab-Brown. “Pipe Dreams: The Taliban and Drugs from the 1990s into Its New Regime.” Brookings, 15 September 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pipe-dreams-the-taliban-and-drugs-from-the-1990s-into-its-new-regime/
[49] Ibid.
[50] John Ward Anderson and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan’s Involvement in Narco-Terrorism.” Extension of Remarks, Congressional Record, 103rd Cong., 3 October 1994. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1994_cr/h941003-terror-pak.htm
[51] Ibid.
[52] David R Winston. “Narco-Insecurity, Inc.: The Convergence of the Narcotics Underworld and Extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Its Global Proliferation.”
[53] Ibid.
[54] Saeed Fazli. “Narcotics Smuggling in Afghanistan: Links between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9, University of Birmingham, 2022. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/narcotics-smuggling-in-afghanistan-paper.pdf
[55] Maria Khoruk. “Smoke and Mirrors: Afghanistan’s Illicit Drug Economy after the Opium Ban.” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 17 February 2025. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/afghanistans-illicit-drug-economy-after-the-opium-ban/
[56] Jelena Bjelica and Nur Khan Himmat. “Migrating Poppy Cultivation: Afghan Poppy Farmers in Balochistan.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 23 February 2025. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/migrating-poppy-cultivation-afghan-poppy-farmers-in-balochistan/
[57] David Mansfield. “Opiate Supplies Continue Despite the Taliban Drugs Ban.”
[58] Fabrizio Foschini and Jelena Bjelica. “The Fourth Year of the Opium Ban: An Update from Two of Afghanistan’s Major Poppy-Growing Areas.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 June 2025. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/the-fourth-year-of-the-opium-ban-an-update-from-two-of-afghanistans-major-poppy-growing-areas/
[59] Syed Ali Shah. “Balochistan Cracks Down on Drug Cultivation.” The Express Tribune, 23 November 2024. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2511300/balochistan-cracks-down-on-drug-cultivation?
[60] David Mansfield. “Opiate Supplies Continue Despite the Taliban Drugs Ban.”
[61] Ibid.
[62] Syed Ali Shah. “Balochistan Cracks Down on Drug Cultivation.”
[63] Prem Mahadevan. “CPEC: Economic Catalyst or Corridor of Discontent?” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2021. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-cpec/
[64] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023: Cultivation and Production after the Ban – Effects and Implications.”
[65] Syed Ali Shah. “Balochistan Cracks Down on Drug Cultivation.”
[66] Katja Mielke. “Opium as an Economic Engine: Drug Economy without Alternatives?” In Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Afghanistan, 207. Potsdam: MGFA, 2007; Jonathan Goodhand. “From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan.” Central Asian Survey 19, no. 2 (2000): 265–280.
[67] Citha D. Maass. “Afghanistan’s Drug Career: Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug Economy.” RP 4. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, March 2011. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2011_RP04_mss_ks.pdf
[68] Ibid.
[69] Jonathan Goodhand and Adam Pain. “Entangled Lives: Drug Assemblages in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan.” Third World Quarterly 43, no. 11 (2022): 2654-2673. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.2002139
[70] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 2: 2024 Opium Production and Rural Development.”
[71] Jelena Bjelica and Fabrizio Foschini. “Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan: The New National Leader, According to UNODC.”
[72] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Drug Insights, Volume 1: Opium Poppy Cultivation 2024.”
[73] Ibid.
[74] Maria Khoruk. “Smoke and Mirrors: Afghanistan’s Illicit Drug Economy after the Opium Ban.”
[75] Jelena Bjelica and Fabrizio Foschini. “Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan: The New National Leader, According to UNODC.”
[76] Patrick Yeager. “Recent Violence Underscores Problems Facing Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province.” The Diplomat, 18 July 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/recent-violence-underscores-problems-facing-afghanistans-badakhshan-province/
[77] Patrick Yeager. “Recent Violence Underscores Problems Facing Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province.”
[78] International Crisis Group. “Trouble In Afghanistan’s Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs.”
[79] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Contemporary Issues on Drugs – World Drug Report 2025.” United Nations, June 2025. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B2_Contemporary_drug_issues.pdf
[80] International Crisis Group. “Trouble In Afghanistan’s Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs.”
[81] Ibid.
[82] Maria Khoruk. “Smoke and Mirrors: Afghanistan’s Illicit Drug Economy after the Opium Ban.”
[83] International Crisis Group. “Trouble In Afghanistan’s Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs.”
[84] William Byrd and Christopher Ward. “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan.” Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Paper No. 18. World Bank, December 2004. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/156391468740439773/pdf/30903.pdf
[85] ACAPS Analysis Hub. “Afghanistan Spotlight on Social Impact (March–June 2024).” Thematic Report, 7 August 2024. https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240807_ACAPS_Spotlight_on_social_impact_6.pdf
[86] Fabrizio Foschini and Jelena Bjelica. “The Fourth Year of the Opium Ban: An Update from Two of Afghanistan’s Major Poppy-Growing Areas.”
[87] ACAPS Analysis Hub. “Afghanistan Spotlight on Social Impact (March–June 2024).”
[88] Ibid.
[89] RASC New Agency. “Taliban Fails to Curb Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan: Farmers Defy Bans Amid Economic Desperation.” Rudabe Applied Studies Center, 23 June 2025. https://rudabe.org/archives/28202
[90] Fabrizio Foschini and Jelena Bjelica. “The Fourth Year of the Opium Ban: An Update from Two of Afghanistan’s Major Poppy-Growing Areas.”
[91] Abubakar Siddique and RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi. “Taliban’s Drug Ban, Heavy-Handed Tactics Fuel Deadly Protests In Northern Afghanistan.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 May 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-badakhshan-protests-taliban-drug-ban/32948643.html
[92] Ibid.
[93] Patrick Yeager. “Recent Violence Underscores Problems Facing Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province.”
[94] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). “Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: April – June 2025.” 2025. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_-_unama_hrs_update_on_human_rights_in_afghanistan_april-june_2025_final.pdf
[95] Mohammad Yunus Yawar. “Blast in North Afghanistan Kills Three Taliban Security Personnel.” Reuters, 9 May 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blast-north-afghanistan-kills-three-taliban-security-personnel-2024-05-08/
[96] Ibid.
[97] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). “Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: April – June 2025.”
[98] Ibid.
[99] Xinhua. “Drug Processing Lab Unearthed, 5 Arrested in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan.” 16 September 2025. https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20250916/6eb5fdede4d14c6fa625167e6d6c05df/c.html
[100] Fabrizio Foschini and Jelena Bjelica. “The Fourth Year of the Opium Ban: An Update from Two of Afghanistan’s Major Poppy-Growing Areas.”
[101] David Mansfield. “A Second Consecutive Year of a Poppy Ban in Afghanistan, but at What Price?” ALCIS, 25 July 2024. Updated 29 July 2024. https://www.alcis.org/post/taliban-poppy-ban-year-2
[102] Vibhu Mishra. “Rise in Afghan opium cultivation reflects economic hardship, despite Taliban ban.” UN News, 6 November 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156566
[103] United Nations Information Service. “UNODC: Opium prices in Afghanistan near historic peaks, mostly benefiting large-scale traffickers.” UNIS/NAR/1495, 12 March 2025. https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2025/unisnar1495.html
[104] Gerry Shih. “After Taliban Bans Opium, a Guilt-Racked Commander Winks at Harvest.” Washington Post, 23 June 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/23/taliban-opium-ban-dissent-afghanistan/
[105] Ibid.
(Adarsh Vijay is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Madras Christian College, Chennai. Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is the Founder & Executive Director of MISS. This analysis has been published as part of Mantraya’s ongoing “Organised Crime & Illicit Trafficking”, “Fragility, Conflict and Peace Building”, and “Mapping Terror & Insurgent Networks” projects. All Mantraya publications are peer-reviewed.)
